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SPOLIATION IN A DIGITAL WORLD:
PROPOSING A NEW STANDARD OF
CULPABILITY IN MASSACHUSETTS FOR AN

ADVERSE INFERENCE INSTRUCTION
I.

INTRODUCTION

Since the advent of the computer, electronic discovery has been an
integral part of litigation.' Only recently have the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure incorporated the use of "electronically stored information"
("ESI").2 The courts, however, have addressed electronic discovery issues
for many years, with the first comprehensive discussion in 2003. 3 The
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the "Rules") were a
response to the comprehensive discussions of the issue in both the court
cases and the guidelines developed by professional conferences.4
Accordingly, the issues surrounding the growth of electronic discovery are
continuously developing in the courts and are a source of increasing
I See Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, ElectronicSpoliation of Evidence, 3 A.L.R. 6th 13, §
2 (2005) (discussing relationship between increased use of technology and scope of information
potentially subject to discovery); Daniel Renwick Hodgman, Comment, A Port in the Storm?:
The Problematic and Shallow Safe Harborfor Electronic Discoven', 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 259,
259-60 (2007) (summarizing history and policy of discovery as it relates to development of
technology).
2 See. e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 16, FED. R. Civ. P. 26, FED. R. Civ. P. 34, FED. R. Civ. P. 45
(identifying types of electronically stored information that are subject to discovery by parties); see
also Lloyd B. Chinn, Federal Rules Leave More Questions than Answers: A Look Back at Court
Decisions Shows New Legal Frontier Ripe ]br Exploration, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 5, 2007, at 2
(describing amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure relating to electronic discovery).
See Zubulake v. LBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake 1), 217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003);
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake 11), 230 F.R.D. 290 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Zubulake v.
UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake 111), 216 F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg
LLC (Zubulake IV), 220 F.R.D. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake
V), 229 F.R.D. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). Zubulake I through Zubulake V were a series of opinions
written by Judge Sheindlin that set out a series of guidelines and extensive analysis of the most
critical issues in electronic discovery. See William R. Maguire & Derek J.T. Adler. Setting
Reasonable Limits in the DigitalEra, at 188 (P.L.I. Litigation and Administrative Practice Course
Handbook Series No. 8511, 2006).
4 See Louis R. Pepe & Jared Cohane, Document Retention, Electronic Discover', EDiscovers
3 Cost Allocation and Spoliation of Evidence: The FourHorsemen of the Apocalypse in
Litigation Toda', 80 CONN. B.J. 331, 342 (2006) (discussing proposed amendments to the Rules
relating to electronic discovery).
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controversy. >
An important discovery issue that is not exclusive to electronic
discovery is spoliation of evidence and the appropriate sanctions that
should be applied to spoliating parties. 6 Spoliation is defined as "'the
destruction, significant alteration, or non-preservation of evidence relevant
to pending or reasonably foreseeable litigation., 7 The most used and
controversial sanction for the spoliation of evidence is an adverse inference
instruction to the jury, also known as a spoliation inference. Throughout
the country, the circuit courts and federal district courts remain split as to
what level of culpability is required for a spoliation inference-mere
negligence or bad faith. 9
Part II of this Note will discuss the history and development of
electronically stored information and digital databases, and its relation to
the practice of litigation.10 Part III will examine the circuit split regarding
the requisite level of culpability for a spoliation inference, and will further
5 See Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, Discovery of Deleted E-mail and Other Deleted
Electronic Records, 27 A.L.R. 6th 565, §§ 4-5 (2007) (explaining discoverability of electronic
documents and courts' rulings on the issue).
See James T. Killelea, Note, Spoliation of Evidence: Proposals .br New York State, 70
BROOK. L. RFV. 1045, 1045-46 (2005) (describing spoliation of evidence and its emergence as
issue in civil litigation). Spoliation is the destruction or intentional withholding of relevant
evidence that a party has the duty to preserve and produce. Id. at 1049.
7 JAY E. GRENIG & WILLIAM C. GLEISNER, 1 EDISCOVERY & DIGITAL EVIDENCE § 11:2
(2007) (defining spoliation of evidence).
Killelea, supra note 6, at 1056 (discussing use of adverse inference instruction as sanction
for spoliation of evidence).
Compare Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin.Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 108 (2d Cir.
2002) (holding negligence sufficient for adverse inference instruction for failure to produce
relevant e-mails), World Courier v. Barone, No. C 06-3072 TEH, 2007 WL 1119196, at *2 (N.D.
Cal. Apr. 16, 2007) (holding negligence sufficient for adverse inference instruction for
destruction of hard drive), Cortes v. Peter Pan Bus Lines, Inc., 455 F. Supp. 2d 100, 103 (D.
Conn. 2006) (holding negligence sufficient for adverse inference instruction for destruction of
incident report), Douglas v. Ingram Barge Co., No. Civ. A 3:04-0383, 2006 WL 1455695, at *3
(S.D. W. Va. Mar. 24, 2006) (holding negligence sufficient for adverse inference instruction for
repainting and resurfacing dock where accident occurred), and Creative Res. Group of N.J., Inc.
v. Creative Res. Group, Inc., 212 F.R.D. 94, 106-07 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding negligence
sufficient for adverse inference instruction for not producing vital documents), with Greyhound
Lines, Inc. v. Wade, 485 F.3d 1032, 1035 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding bad faith or gross negligence
necessary for adverse inference instruction for electronic control module), King v. Ill. Cent. R.R.,
337 F.3d 550, 556 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding plaintiff "must show that [the defendant] acted in 'bad
faith' to establish that it was entitled to an adverse inference."), Minter v. Prime Equip. Co., No.
CIV-02-132-KEW, 2007 WL 2703093, at *3-4 (E.D. Okla. Sept. 14, 2007) (holding bad faith or
gross negligence necessary for instruction on non-production of inspection records), and Smith v.
Am. Founders Fin., Corp., 365 B.R. 647, 681 (S.D. Tex. 2007) (holding bad faith or gross
negligence necessary for instruction on destruction of documents held as trustee).
I0 See ilra Part 11.
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analyze the state of the law in Massachusetts."
Finally, Part IV will
propose a new standard
of
negligence
for
a
spoliation
inference in
2
courts.'
Massachusetts
DISCOVERABILITY OF ELECTRONIC INFORMATION AND
DIGITAL DATABASES
Courts have been forced to address electronic discovery issues
since corporations and individuals began storing information on
computers. 3 While the courts treat electronically stored information no
differently than paper documents in terms of its discoverability, electronic
discovery presents many issues that are fundamentally different than those
associated with traditional discovery. 14
A.

A Brief Overview of DigitalDatabases
In today's increasingly electronic world, more than ninety percent

of all business records are digital, and oftentimes are never committed to
paper. 15 Almost all of those records are stored on digital databases, which
are organized to facilitate the rapid search and retrieval of data.' 6 These

databases contain not only the business documents traditionally kept by
companies, such as spreadsheets and reports, but also other forms of
communication-most importantly, e-mails. 7 There are five traditional

categories of data: (1)active, online data; (2) near-line data; (3) offline
storage/archives; (4) backup tapes; and (5) erased, fragmented or damaged
data.' 8 With such an enormous amount of data stored in these databases
II See infra Part III.

12 See infra Part IV.
13 See Timothy J. Chorvat, E-Discover, and Electronic Evidence in the Courtroom, BUS. L.
TODAY, Sept./Oct. 2007, at 13; Jason Krause, The Paperless Chase, ABA JOURNAL MAGAZINE,
Apr. 2005, available at http://www.abajoumal.com/magazine/thepaperlesschase; GRENIG &
GLEISNER, supra note 7, at § 7:18; see also Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, Discovery of
Deleted E-mail and Other Deleted Electronic Records, 27 A.L.R.6th 565, § 2 (2007) (discussing
history of electronic databases pertaining to discovery issues).
14 See Maria Perez Crist, Preserving the Duty to Preserve: The Increasing Vulnerabilitv of
Electronic Information, 58 S.C. L. REV. 7, 8, 11 (2006) (highlighting the "lack of accountability
in the handling of electronic information" and its relationship to discovery issues).
15 See Crist, supra note 14, at 8-9 (noting business information and communication stored
electronically).
16 Id. (describing basic structure of electronic databases).
17 Id. (describing type of information stored on electronic databases).
18 See Zubulake 1, 217 F.R.D. 309, 318-20 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (outlining and describing five
categories of data storage); see also Crist, supra note 14, at 30-32 (describing five categories of
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every day, companies must implement comprehensive retention policies so
as not to run afoul of any legal obligation to retain documents.'0 Without

data). The court in Zubulake I described the five categories as follows:
1. Active, online data: On-line storage is generally provided by magnetic disk. It is
used in the very active stages of an electronic records [sic] life-when it is being
created or received and processed, as well as when the access frequency is high and the
required speed of access is very fast, i.e., milliseconds. Examples of online data
include hard drives.
2. Near-line data: This typically consists of a robotic storage device (robotic library)
that houses removable media, uses robotic arms to access the media, and uses multiple
read/write devices to store and retrieve records. Access speeds can range from as low
as milliseconds if the media is already in a read device, up to 10-30 seconds for optical
disk technology, and between 20-120 seconds for sequentially searched media, such as
magnetic tape. Examples include optical disks.
3. Of/1line storage/archives:This is removable optical disk or magnetic tape media,
which can be labeled and stored in a shelf or rack. Off-line storage of electronic
records is traditionally used for making disaster copies of records and also for records
considered "archival" in that their likelihood of retrieval is minimal. Accessibility to
off-line media involves manual intervention and is much slower than on-line or nearline storage. Access speed may be minutes, hours, or even days, depending on the
access-effectiveness of the storage facility. The principled difference between nearline
data and offline data is that off-line data lacks the "coordinated control of an intelligent
disk subsystem," and is, in the lingo, JBOD ("Just a Bunch of Disks").
4. Backup Tapes: A device, like a tape recorder, that reads data from and writes it onto
a tape. Tape drives have data capacities of anywhere from a few hundred kilobytes to
several gigabytes. Their transfer speeds also vary considerably ...The disadvantage
of tape drives is that they are sequential-access devices, which means that to read any
particular block of data, you need to read all the preceding blocks. As a result, the data
on a backup tape are not organized for retrieval of individual documents or files
[because] . . .the organization of the data mirrors the computer's structure, not the
human records management structure. Backup tapes also typically employ some sort
of data compression, permitting more data to be stored on each tape, but also making
restoration more time-consuming and expensive, especially given the lack of uniform
standard governing data compression.
5. Erased,fragmented or damaged data: When a file is first created and saved, it is
laid down on the [storage media] in contiguous clusters ...As files are erased, their
clusters are made available again as free space. Eventually, some newly created files
become larger than the remaining contiguous free space. These files are then broken
up and randomly placed throughout the disk. Such broken-up files are said to be
"fragmented," and along with damaged and erased data can only be accessed after
significant processing.
Zubulake 1, 217 F.R.D. at 318-20 (internal citations omitted).
19 See Pepe & Cohane, supra note 4, at 332-38 (explaining the importance of document
retention policies). There are two important forces that should assist a company in formulating a
retention policy: the internal operational structure of the company and legal obligations. Id. at
333; see also James R. Arnold et al., E-Discover' and Records Management: A Risk-Based
Approach, THE METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., July 2007, at 38 (discussing records management
with a view towards e-discovery); Jennifer A.L. Battle, Litigation Hold Letters: Avoiding
Destruction ol Electronic Data, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, July 13, 2007, at 5 (outlining
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such a policy, important electronic records could be in danger of being
recycled or destroyed, leaving the company legally liable.2 °
B.

The Response to ElectronicDiscovery - 2006 Amendments to the
FederalRules of Civil Procedureand the Zubulake Decisions

Despite the existence of ESI for many years, the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure have been slow to adapt to technological advancements. 2
The Rules have only been amended twice to reflect the development of
electronic discovery, first in 1970 and, most recently in 2006.22 In 1970,
23
the term "data compilations" was added to the list of discoverable items.
In 2006, that term was replaced with the current wording, "electronically
stored information.- 24 The amendments to the Rules in 2006 also laid out
procedures to follow during discovery regarding ESI. 5
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg,26 a series of five decisions by Judge
Shiendeli, is the seminal case about discovery of electronically stored
information. 27 This case concerned the discoverability of certain e-mails
compliance with new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); George E. Kostel & Richard D. Kelly,
What's in Your Electronic Filing Cabinet? Companies Must Set Up a Formal Document
Retention Polic', LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 16, 2007, at 41. According to the Legal Times, "nearly S2
billion was spent on the retrieval and review of electronic information in litigation. With no
document retention policy to manage this information, companies could be forced to spend
astronomical sums just to retrieve it, and face court-imposed sanctions to boot." Id. It is
increasingly clear that implementing document retention policies is the most economically
efficient method to deal with lawsuits and avoid litigation. See id.
2) See sources cited supra note 19 (discussing the importance of retention policies).
21 See Chorvat, supra note 13, at 13 (providing historical overview of electronic discovery);
see also Chinn, supra note 2, at 2 (discussing history of amendments to the Rules relating to
electronically stored information); Jonathan M. Hoff & Douglas I. Koff, What Next in EDiscoiver: New Amendments Offer Step Toward Uniformit ' But Questions Remain, N.Y.L.J.,
Feb. 20, 2007 at S4 (discussing new amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Sheri
Qualters, Getting Up to Speed: With New E-Discoverv Rules Coming Online, Lalvers Wrestle
with the Cost of ProducingE-Stored Docunents, BROWARD DAILY Bus. REV., Oct. 15, 2007, at
12 (discussing history of amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure relating to
electronically stored information).
22 See Chorvat, supra note 13, at 13 (noting history and development of electronic
discovery).
23 See id. (describing addition of terms to list of discoverable items).
24 See id. (describing origin of phrase "electronically stored information").
25 See id.(outlining 2006 amendments to the Rules).
26 Zubulake 1, 217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Zubulake II, 230 F.R.D. 290 (S.D.N.Y.
2003); Zubulake 111,
216 F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. 212, (S.D.N.Y.
2003); Zubulake V,229 F.R.D. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
27 Zubulake 1, 217 F.R.D. at 324 (stating plaintiff was entitled to discovery of deleted e-mails
only residing on back-up discs); Zubulake II, 230 F.R.D. at 293 (ruling on matter unrelated to
electronic discovery); Zubulake III, 216 F.R.D. at 289 (holding shifting percentage of back-up
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that were stored on UBS employees' computers or stored on back-up tapes
in a gender discrimination suit. 2
In Zubulake I, UBS contended that
producing the e-mails would be cost-prohibitive, and therefore not subject
to discovery.Judge Scheindlin first discussed the types of data that a
back-up system contains, dividing them into five categories: (1) active.,
online data; (2) near-line data; (3) offline, storage/archives; (4) back-up
tapes; and (5) erased, fragmented or damaged data. 30 The first three
categories are considered "available" data, while the last two are
considered "unavailable" data. 3' The court ruled that available data is
automatically discoverable, and developed a seven-part test to determine
whether certain unavailable data is discoverable. 32
Zubulake III centered around the issue of who should pay for the
restoration and production of electronic information stored on back-up
tapes. 33 In Zubulake I, instead of making UBS produce all of the back-up
tapes of emails, the court ordered the plaintiff to take a sample number of
back-up tapes to determine whether the restoration would produce relevant
evidence, and who should bear the cost of restoration for the rest of the
tapes using the seven part test outlined in that decision.34 After the sample
tape restoration and search costs to employee appropriate, but not cost of producing emails from
backup tapes): Zuhulake It, 220 F.R.D. at 222 (ruling defendant had duty to preserve backup
tapes, but adverse inference instruction was not warranted for failure to do so); Zubulake V, 229
F.R.D. at 436-38 (holding adverse inference instruction warranted for willful destruction of emails, and shifting costs to defendant).
28 Zbulake 1, 217 F.R.D. at 312 (discussing facts and history of discovery dispute).
29 M. at313.
30 Id. at 318-320; see also supra note 18 and accompanying text (outlining and describing
five categories of data storage).
31 Zhulake 1, 217 F.R.D. at 319-20 (describing categories of data).
32 i. at 322 (discussing the previous test for cost allocation and modifying it). The
new
"Seven Factor Test" is as follows:
1. The extent to which the request is specifically tailored to discover relevant
information;
2. The availability of such information from other sources;
3. The total cost of production, compared to the amount in controversy;
4. The total cost of production, compared to the resources available to each party;
5. The relative availability of each party to control costs and its incentive to do so;
6. The importance of the issues at stake in the litigation; and
7. The relative benefits to the parties of obtaining the information.
hi. The court then went on to say these seven factors should not be weighted equally, nor should
the test "be mechanically applied at the risk of losing sight of its purpose." I. at 322-23. The
first two factors are the most important, followed by the cost factors, and the last factor is the
least important. See id. at 323.
33 See Zubulake II. 216 F.R.D. at 281.
;4 See Zbuiake 1, 217 F.R.D. at 324 (discussing the conclusion and order to
the parties).
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e-mails were analyzed, the court in Zubulake III then allocated the cost of
producing the remaining e-mails using the seven part test. 35 Zubulake IV
and V, however, discussed what happens when those e-mails are not
produced either by intentional destruction or as part of normal maintenance
of files, known as spoliation. 36
III. SPOLIATION OF ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE

Despite the vast amount of information stored in electronic
databases, a company still has a duty to preserve any and all electronic
evidence when that company either knows or should know that the
evidence may be relevant to future litigation.37 Once a future litigant is on
notice that the evidence could be relevant, it is her duty to put a "litigation
hold" on all of the relevant documents and preserve them. 38 This does not
necessarily mean that these "held" documents must be produced, but only
that they must be preserved during discovery.3 9 When documents are not

preserved, either by intentional destruction or through routine maintenance,
the result is spoliation.4 °
The final order by the court was that the responding party should bear the cost of producing
relevant available data. Id. Because the cost-shifting analysis is fact-sensitive, the court must
determine what data may be found on the inaccessible media; thus, the responding party must
provide a small sample of that media to determine whether it contains any relevant information.
Id
35 See Zubulake I1, 216 F.R.D. at 284-89 (analyzing the cost-shifting factors). After going
through the seven part test, the court concluded that the cost should be split between the two
parties; UBS was ordered to pay seventy-five percent and the plaintiff was ordered to pay twentyfive percent. Id. at 291.
36 See Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 219 (ruling defendant had duty to preserve backup tapes).
Despite this ruling, the court held an adverse inference instruction was not warranted at this stage
for failure to preserve. Id.; see also Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. at 439-40 (determining adverse
inference instruction warranted for willful destruction of e-mails).
37 See Crist, supra note 14, at 8-9 (discussing the risks and duties of electronically stored
information as it relates to litigation); see also, e.g., David A. Bell et al., Lets Level the Playing
Field: A New Proposalfor Analysis of Spoliation of Evidence Claims in Pending Litigation, 29
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 769, 772-73 (1997) (discussing the definition of spoliation); Killelea, supra note 6,
at 1046 (defining spoliation of evidence); Drew D. Dropkin, Note, Linking the Culpabilit' and
CircumstantialEvidence Requirements./or the Spoliation Inference, 51 DUKE L.J. 1803, 1806-07
(2002) (discussing the prevalence of spoliation of evidence in litigation).
38 See Crist, supra note 14, at 34-38; see also Bell, supra note 37, at 774-75; Dropkin, supra
note 37, at 1807-10 (discussing why litigation holds are important in document retention and
discovery).
39 See Crist, supra note 14, at 34-38; see also Bell, supra note 37, at 774-75; Dropkin, supra
note 37, at 1807-1810 (discussing duty to preserve potentially relevant evidence in pending
litigation).
40 See Crist, supra note 14, at 34-38; see also Bell, supra note 37, at 774-75: Dropkin, supra
note 37, at 1807-1810 (describing consequences of not preserving potentially relevant
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Spoliation and Remedies Available to the Non-Spoliating Party

Spoliation is defined as "the destruction or significant alteration of
evidence, or the failure to preserve property for another's use as evidence
The elements of
in pending or reasonably foreseeable litigation. '
spoliation include an act of destruction, the intent of the party to destroy the
evidence, the destruction of the evidence after the party was on notice to
preserve it, and the relevance of the evidence destroyed.42 Once these
elements are satisfied, it is within the court's discretion to choose the
appropriate remedy for the non-spoliating party.43 Each jurisdiction applies
its own unique method of determining the appropriate remedy, considering
fairness to the parties and the seriousness of harm to the innocent party.4 4
These remedies run the gamut from an adverse judgment against the
spoliating party, to an adverse inference instruction, to a mere shifting of
Some
the burden of cost of discovery, and to other sanctions.45
jurisdictions have chosen to develop criminal penalties for particularly
serious instances of spoliation and a separate cause of action for the tort of
spoliation. 6 The choice of remedy is often determined by the culpability
of the spoliator-the more culpable the spoliator, the harsher the penalty.47
B.

CircuitSplit Regarding Level of Culpabilityfor Adverse Inference

One of the most common and devastating remedies for spoliation is
an adverse inference instruction. 4' This is a judicial instruction informing
the jury that a piece of evidence was destroyed, and, as a result, the jury is
allowed to infer that the evidence would have been adverse to the

documents).
41 Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. 212, 216 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (quoting West v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 167 F.3d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 1999)).
42 See Chorvat, supranote 13, at 15 (outlining the elements of spoliation).
43 See id. (describing court's role in providing remedy for spoliation).
44 See Killelea, supra note 6, at 1056-70 (comparing remedies available to innocent parties
for spoliation).
45 See id. at 1055-64 (describing options available to remedy spoliation).
46 See id. at 1064-65 (noting a few jurisdictions recognizing a separate cause of action for
spoliation).
47 See supra note 37 and accompanying text (relating culpability of spoliator to appropriate
remedy).
48 See Killelea, supra note 6,at 1056 (discussing the adverse inference instruction). In an
adverse inference instruction, "the court instructs the jury to presume that destroyed evidence, if
produced, would have been adverse to the party that destroyed it." Id. A plaintiff, however,
cannot rely on an adverse inference as an essential element of its case. Id. at 1057.
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spoliating party.49 Often, when an adverse inference instruction is given,
litigation ceases because it is very difficult to recover from such an
instruction.5 ° In recent years, a circuit split has developed as to the level of
culpability required by the spoliating party to warrant an adverse inference
instruction. 5 1
In 2002, the Second Circuit decided the case of Residential
Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Financial Corp.52 This was a breach of
contract case in which the defendant, DeGeorge Financial Corp.
("DeGeorge"), sought an adverse inference instruction from the district
court because the plaintiff, Residential Funding Corp. ("RFC"), failed to
produce relevant emails in a timely manner. 53 The district court denied the
motion because the delay in producing the emails was not the result of bad
faith or gross negligence on the part of RFC.54 The Second Circuit
49 See Zubulake V,229 F.R.D. 422, 436-38 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (discussing remedy available
for

the non-spoliating party). The instruction that the court awarded was as follows:
You have heard that UBS failed to produce some of the e-mails sent or received by
UBS personnel in August and September 2001. Plaintiff has argued that this evidence
was in defendants' control and would have proven facts material to the matter in
controversy.
If you find that UBS could have produced this evidence, and that the evidence was
within its control, and that the evidence would have been material in deciding facts in
dispute in this case, you are permitted, but not required, to infer that the evidence
would have been unfavorable to UBS.
In deciding whether to draw this inference, you should consider whether the evidence
not produced would merely have duplicated other evidence already before you. You
may also consider whether you are satisfied that UBS's failure to produce this
information was reasonable. Again, any inference you decide to draw should be based
on all of the facts and circumstances in this case.
li.at 439-40.
5o See Killelea, supra note 6, at 1056-57 (discussing adverse inference instruction and its
effect on litigation).
51 See cases cited supra note 9 and accompanying text (illustrating circuit split).
52 306 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2002).
53 Id. at 102 (discussing case history).
The defendant, DeGeorge Financial Corp.
("DeGeorge"), made its first request for any relevant e-mails in April 2001. Id. at 102.
Residential Funding Corp. ("RFC") agreed to produce the e-mails with a vendor's assistance after
being unable to retrieve any of the e-mails from the backup tapes. Id.at 102-03. After numerous
delays and technical problems, RFC agreed to produce the backup tapes themselves so that
DeGeorge could retrieve the data using its own vendor. Id. at 104. However, RFC refused to
give any information to help the vendor retrieve the documents, claiming it had fulfilled its
obligation, and thus, DeGeorge should "just try to figure it out." Id. Consequently, no e-mails
from the requested time period were produced due to physical damage or absence from the tapes.
Id. at 104. A few days later, DeGeorge moved for sanctions. Id.
i4Id. at 105 (discussing lower court's decision). The district court cited Reilly v. Natwest
Markets Group. Inc.,
181 F.3d 253, 267-68 (2d Cir. 1999), in ruling that DeGeorge was not
entitled to an adverse inference instruction because he had not established that RFC acted with
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reversed, holding that mere negligence is sufficient
for discovery sanctions,
S 5
including an adverse inference instruction.
In subsequent cases, many
district courts followed the Second Circuit in ruling that negligence is
sufficient for an adverse inference instruction. 6
The Eighth Circuit, in Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Wade, 5 disagreed
with the Second Circuit's decision, and found that more than negligence
was needed for an adverse inference instruction.5"
Greyhound Lines
involved a negligence claim against a truck driver after an accident with a
bus.: 9 The bus in question had an electronic control module ("ECM") that
stored information such as speed and mechanical failures.6 ° The ECM
showed that a mechanical failure caused the bus to slow its speed. 61
Greyhound subsequently sent the ECM to the engine manufacturer, who
erased the data before the lawsuit was filed.62 The defendant filed a motion
for sanctions based upon the spoliation of the evidence, which was denied
by the district court.6 3 The Eighth Circuit upheld the district court's denial

of sanctions, ruling that mere negligence is not sufficient to warrant
64
sanctions for spoliation; instead, a certain level of bad faith is required.

bad faith or gross negligence. Residential Funding Corp., 306 F.3d at 105. The court also ruled
that DeGeorge did not adequately prove the e-mails could have been beneficial to the case, which
is a necessary element of spoliation. Id. at 106. The Second Circuit reversed the first ruling but
retained the requirement that the requesting party prove that the e-mails would have been
beneficial when the spoliating party was negligent. Id. at 112.
55 Residential Funding Corp., 306 F.3d at 108-09 (reversing lower court's ruling denying
sanctions). The court also ruled that in instances where bad faith is shown by the spoliating party,
there is a presumption that the evidence would have been harmful. Id. at 109. Where negligence
is shown, the innocent party must prove that the evidence would have been relevant and harmful.
Id
56 See. e.g., World Courier v. Barone, No. C 06-3072 TEH, 2007 WL 1119196, at *1-2 (N.D.
Cal. Apr. 16, 2007); Cortes v. Peter Pan Bus Lines, Inc., 455 F. Supp. 2d 100, 102-03 (D. Conn.
2006); Douglas v. Ingram Barge Co., No. Civ.A 3:04-0383, 2006 WL 1455695, at *3 (S.D.W.
Va. Mar. 24, 2006); Creative Res. Group of N.J., Inc. v. Creative Res. Group, Inc., 212 F.R.D. 94
at 106-07 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding mere negligence by spoliating party sufficient to issue
adverse inference instruction).
57 485 F.3d 1032 (8th Cir. 2007).
5'X See id at 1037 (holding no error in denying sanction). The court required a level of bad
faith on the part of the spoliator in order to award an adverse inference instruction. Id.
59 See id. at 1034 (explaining facts).
61 See id.

1 See id. (describing underlying incident).
62 See Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Wade, 485 F.3d 1032, 1034 (8th Cir. 2007) (describing
destruction of electronic evidence).
63 See id. at 1035 (discussing procedural history). The sanctions requested were for the nonproduction of the e-mails, as well as for non-responsive answers to the inquiries. Id.
64 See id. (discussing requirements for sanctions). The court ruled that there
was no
spoliation and stated, "the ultimate focus for imposing sanctions for spoliation of evidence is the
intentional destruction of evidence indicating a desire to suppress the truth, not the prospect of
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District courts across the country have followed the Eighth Circuit's
ruling.65
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ("SJC") has ruled on
the issue of sanctions for spoliation during discovery, but not specifically
on the adverse inference instruction.66 The jurisprudence of the SJC
regarding spoliation is instructive in crafting a proposal for adopting a level
of culpability required for an adverse inference instruction based upon the
spoliation of evidence.6 y
C.

CurrentState of MassachusettsLaw

In Massachusetts, the SJC has a fairly nebulous approach to
imposing sanctions for spoliation of evidence during discovery.68
Admittedly, this approach has surpassed every other jurisdiction in its
imposition of sanctions for spoliation.69
The sanction most often
administered by Massachusetts courts is the exclusion of integral evidence
for the spoliating party that relies on the spoliated evidence. y When
litigation." Id. The court also ruled that the discovery responses were responsive and that the
non-spoliating party was not prejudiced by untimely disclosure. Id.
65 See, e.g., Escobar v. City of Houston, No. 04-1945, 2007 WL 2900581, at *17-19 (S.D.
Tex. Sept. 29, 2007) (maintaining bad faith or gross negligence required for adverse inference
instruction for destruction of electronic control module); Minter v. Prime Equip. Co., No. CIV02-132-KEW, 2007 WL 2703093, at *3 (E.D. Okla. Sept. 14, 2007) (requiring bad faith required
for an adverse inference instruction for non-production of inspection records); Smith v. Am.
Founders Fin., Corp., 365 B.R. 647, 681-82 (S.D. Tex. 2007) (finding bad faith or gross
negligence required for instruction on destruction of documents held as trustee).
66 See, e.g., Keene v. Brigham & Women's Hosp., Inc., 786 N.E.2d 824, 833-34 (Mass.
2003) (detailing appropriate sanctions and default judgment requirements for lost medical records
in a medical malpractice case); Fletcher v. Dorchester Mutual Ins. Co., 773 N.E.2d 420, 424-25
(Mass. 2002) (discussing whether to recognize separate cause of action for spoliation); Kippenhan
v. Chaulk Servs., Inc., 697 N.E.2d 527, 529-30 (Mass. 1998) (discussing appropriate sanction for
losing physical evidence in negligence claim).
67 See cases cited supra note 66 and accompanying text (summarizing spoliation
jurisprudence in Massachusetts).
68 See cases cited supra note 66 and accompanying text (listing Massachusetts precedent).
The court in Fletcher summed up the approach to spoliation: "[S]anctions for spoliation are
carefully tailored to remedy the precise unfairness occasioned by that spoliation. . . . As such,
the remedies to which a victim of spoliation is entitled will be conclusively determined in the
underlying action." Fletcher,773 N.E.2d at 426.
69 See Fletcher, 773 N.E.2d at 426 (discussing development of exclusion rule). The court
stated, "we have gone further than other jurisdictions, many of which address spoliation merely
by permitting an adverse inference against the party responsible for the spoliation." Id.
70 See Kippenhan, 697 N.E.2d at 530-31 (describing exclusion remedy for spoliation); see
also Fletcher, 773 N.E.2d at 425 (recounting lower court's previous rulings on exclusion of
evidence as sanction for spoliation). The rule was developed in the context of expert witnesses
using spoliated evidence to form opinions. Id. at 426 (citing Nally v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc.,
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addressing more serious instances of spoliation, the court may direct a
verdict on an entire claim that relied on the spoliated evidence. 7 This
ambiguous approach has imparted more discretion to the courts to impose a
of the spoliator
sanction that is commensurate with the level of culpability
2
and the importance of the evidence to the non-spoliator.i
The first sanction adopted by the SJC, and the most favored, goes
beyond the adverse inference instruction. 3 If a party destroys or alters
evidence resulting in the prejudice or unfairness to the opposing party, a
judge has the power to exclude evidence to fix the unfairness.7 4 This
remedy only applies to parties who have a duty to preserve the evidence.75
Excluding evidence is, in many ways, harsher than an adverse inference
instruction.76 By excluding evidence that could change the outcome of a
case, the judge is unilaterally declaring the spoliated evidence as adverse to
the spoliating party. 7 When an adverse inference instruction is given, the
jury must decide whether the spoliated evidence would have been adverse
to the spoliating party. 78 The SJC believes, however, that the exclusion of

539 N.E.2d 1017, 1021 (Mass. 1989)). The court based this rule "on both the unfair prejudice
that would otherwise result and the fact of a negligent or intentional destruction of physical
evidence." Fletcher, 773 N.E.2d at 426.
71 See Fletcher, 773 N.E.2d at 427 (explaining burden of proof requirement for spoliation
claims). The court justified this expansive approach by describing the destruction of relevant
evidence as, "'an unqualified wrong,' that has a pernicious effect on the truth-finding functions of
our courts." Id. (citations omitted).
72 See id. at 426. The SJC's approach to sanctions for spoliation considers the specific facts
and circumstances of the underlying case, and "carefully tailor[s]" sanctions to remedy the
unfairness caused by the spoliation. Id. at 427-28.
73 See cases cited supra note 70 and accompanying text.
74 See Fletcher, 773 N.E.2d at 425-26 (listing examples of spoliation and remedies). The
Fletcher court stated the general rule:
Where evidence has been destroyed or altered by persons who are parties to the
litigation, or by persons affiliated with a party (in particular, their expert witnesses),
and another party's ability to prosecute or defend the claim has been prejudiced as a
result, we have held that a judge may exclude evidence to remedy that unfairness.
Id. at 425 (citing Kippenham, 697 N.E.2d at 530).
75 See Fletcher, 773 N.E.2d at 426 (upholding duty to preserve relevant evidence); see also
Kippenhan, 697 N.E.2d at 530 (stating duty to preserve relevant evidence relied upon by expert
witness); Keene v. Brigham & Women's Hosp., Inc., 786 N.E.2d 824, 833 (Mass. 2003)
(reiterating rule for preserving relevant evidence under the spoliation doctrine). The court in
Keene also discussed the defendant's statutory duty to preserve medical records. Id.
76 See Kippenhan, 697 N.E.2d at 531 (explaining Massachusetts approach to adverse
inference sanctions for spoliation). The SJC calls its approach a "minority position" and
describes the adverse inference as a "less severe rule." Id.
77 See Fletcher, 773 N.E.2d at 425-26 (debating exclusion remedy for spoliation).
78 See supra note 49 and accompanying text (discussing adverse inference jury instruction
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evidence is an appropriate remedy, going beyond the adverse inference
instruction .
In Keene v. Brigham and Women's Hospital, Inc., ° the SJC went
even further to uphold a default judgment of liability as a sanction for the
spoliation of medical records in a medical malpractice case. 8 1 In Keene, the
court ruled that because the lost medical records were so vitally important
to the plaintiff s case, the only equitable remedy was a default judgment of
liability.12 The trial judge, rather than the jury, decided the issue of
whether the medical records were adverse to the defendant. 3 This case is
the farthest the SJC has gone; however, the court repeatedly has declined to
recognize a separate cause of action for spoliation.
IV. ANALYSIS
Both the exclusion of evidence and the default judgment remedies
offered for spoliation of evidence indicate an underlying theme to the
Massachusetts courts' approachY. A remedy for spoliation should be given
with an eye towards fairness and leveling the playing field for the innocent,
non-spoliating party 8.
The SJC, however, has placed an emphasis on the
exclusion of evidence and default judgments, moving beyond the adverse
inference instruction.87 The adverse inference instruction gives the jury,
which is the cornerstone of the American judicial system, the choice to
believe whether or not the withheld evidence is adverse to the spoliating

given in a case).
7) See, e.g., Keene, 786 N.E.2d at 833-34 (detailing appropriate sanctions and default
judgment requirements for lost medical records in medical malpractice cases); Fletcher, 773
N.E.2d at 424-25 (discussing whether to recognize separate cause of action for spoliation);
Kippenhan, 697 N.E.2d at 529-30 (discussing appropriate sanction for losing physical evidence in
negligence claim).
80 786 N.E.2d 824 (Mass. 2003).
I1d. at 835 (ruling default judgment on issue of liability appropriate sanction for spoliation).
82 Id.
X Id.
94 See Fletcher, 773 N.E.2d at 426-28 (denying separate cause of action for spoliation). The
court followed other jurisdictions in finding that "'allowing a separate cause of action for
spoliation would recognize a claim that, by definition, could not be proved without resort to

multiple levels of speculation." Id. at 426.
85 See supra notes 66, 69-72 and accompanying text (outlining current state of spoliation

jurisprudence in Massachusetts).
96 See Fletcher, 773 N.E.2d at 427 (discussing importance of fairness in crafting a remedy
for discovery violations such as spoliation).
87 See supra note 70 and accompanying text (describing exclusion remedy for spoliation).
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party." The Massachusetts rule, however, prevents the jury from making
the decision and gives the trial judge sole discretion.89 For this reason, the
adverse inference instruction should be the preferred remedy for
spoliation." Despite this flaw in jurisprudence, an increasing emphasis on
fairness provides support for adopting the 9 proper level of culpability
necessary for an adverse inference instruction. '
To properly consider and account for fairness, the appropriate level
of culpability for an adverse inference instruction should be negligence.92
This will encourage parties with extensive digital databases and
electronically stored information to implement comprehensive retention
policies.93 Comprehensive retention policies are an important element in
streamlining litigation and making it more efficient. 94 Additionally,
requiring bad faith on the part of the spoliating party is unfair to the
innocent non-spoliating party. 95 Often, the missing or destroyed evidence
is essential to the innocent party's case and denies that party a defense or
claim in the litigation.96

" See Killelea, supra note 6, at 1056 (discussing jury's role in administering adverse
inference instruction).
8 See Fletcher, 773 N.E.2d at 427 (introducing exclusion remedy for spoliation of evidence
during discovery).
90 See in/ra notes 92-101 and accompanying text (discussing advantage of adverse inference
instruction as remedy for spoliation).
91 See Killelea, supra note 6, at 1056; see also Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. 422, 436-38
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (recounting application of adverse inference instruction as remedy for
spoliation).
92 See Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 108-09 (2d Cir.
2002) (discussing court's reasoning for ruling negligence sufficient for adverse inference
instruction as remedy for spoliation).
93 See Kostel & Kelly, supra note 19, at 41 (emphasizing importance of comprehensive
document retention policies to litigation process). "Nearly $2 billion was spent on the retrieval
and review of electronic information in litigation. With no document retention policy to manage
this information, companies could be forced to spend astronomical sums just to retrieve it, and
face court-imposed sanctions to boot." Id. at 41. It is increasingly clear that implementing
document retention policies is the most economically efficient method to deal with lawsuits and
avoid litigation. See id
94 See Arnold, supra note 19, at 38 (discussing importance of records management with a
view towards electronic discovery).
9 See ResidentialFunding Corp., 306 F.3d at 108-09 (discussing court's reasoning for ruling
negligence sufficient for adverse inference instruction as remedy for spoliation). The court in this
case reversed the lower court and awarded an adverse inference instruction. Id. As long as the
evidence was relevant and possibly beneficial to the innocent party, the adverse inference was
only fair. See id
96 See id. at 108 (discussing spoliation in context of litigation and importance of withheld
information). The court stated:
The adverse inference provides the necessary mechanism for restoring the evidentiary
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The purpose of sanctions for spoliation of evidence is more than
simply punishing the wrong-doer. 97 A primary purpose of sanctions during
discovery should be to level the judicial playing field. 98 Requiring bad
faith on the part of the spoliating party would shift the focus of sanctions to
punishment of the culpable party. 99 By shifting the focus to punishment,
the innocent non-spoliating party is forgotten, and fairness to the innocent
party is no longer important.10°
Because of this, bad faith is an

inappropriate standard
for an adverse inference instruction against the
10

spoliating party. '
Requiring bad faith would also be unduly harsh on the innocent
non-spoliating party. °2 Spoliation by its very nature puts the innocent
party at a disadvantage, particularly when the destroyed or missing
evidence is essential to a defense or claim.' 0 3 If a party has a duty to
preserve evidence and that party negligently destroys or withholds that
evidence, it is only fair that the innocent party has recourse. 0 4 The most
common and effective recourse for the innocent party is an adverse
inference instruction. 105 By requiring the innocent party to prove bad faith

balance. The inference is adverse to the destroyer not because of any finding of moral
culpability, but because the risk that the evidence would have been detrimental rather
than favorable should fall on the party responsible for its loss.
Id.
97 See id (outlining purpose behind adverse inference instruction as remedy for spoliation).
The court stated, "[the] sanction [of an adverse inference] should be available even for the
negligent destruction of documents if that is necessary to further the remedial purpose of the
inference." Id.
98 See id. Fletcher v. Dorchester Mut. Ins. Co., 773 N.E.2d 420, 425-26 (Mass. 2002)
(emphasizing fairness in crafting remedy for spoliation of evidence during discovery).
99 See supra note 96 and accompanying text (noting importance of fairness in crafting a
remedy for spoliation).
100 See supra note 96 and accompanying text (noting purpose of sanctions is not to punish
moral culpability).
101 See supra Part III(A).
102 See Dropkin, supra note 37, at 1825-26 (discussing level of culpability for spoliation
inference). The purpose of the spoliation inference is remedial, attempting "to restore the
adversarial balance that was disrupted when the spoliating party innocently, negligently, reckless,
or intentionally ...permitted relevant evidence to be destroyed." Id. But see Killelea, supra note
6, at 1060 (advising against using the adverse inference instruction as remedy for spoliation).
Killelea writes, "[the] risk of unduly prejudicing the position of the spoliatior is a valid reason for
not using the adverse inference instruction." Id.
103 See Killelea, supra note 6, at 1060 (describing effect of spoliation on parties to a lawsuit).
104 See id. (describing purpose of sanctions for discovery violations, particularly spoliation).
105 See id. at 1056 (describing adverse inference instruction as the most common and
controversial remedy for spoliation).
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6
by the spoliating party, this recourse often would not 07be available.,'
Therefore, bad faith is unduly harsh on the innocent party.
Negligence should be the proper level of culpability for an adverse
inference instruction because requiring bad faith is contrary to the purpose
of discovery sanctions and is unduly harsh to the innocent party.10
In
order to satisfy the level of sanctions for spoliation, a party must have
breached a duty to preserve important evidence to the litigation.1° 9 It
should not matter whether this duty was breached in bad faith or
negligence." 0 If an innocent party is able to prove willfulness or bad faith,
the sanctions should exceed a mere adverse inference instruction, which
may be ignored by the jury.'
Requiring negligence, rather than bad faith, for an adverse
inference instruction will also encourage parties to implement better
2
retention policies, and to enforce litigation holds more conscientiously."
When parties to litigation have effective retention and litigation hold
3
policies, discovery is more efficient, and spoliation is less problematic."

Currently, spoliation is a major problem in litigation.' 14 The courts can
reduce this problem by creating an incentive to make electronic document
retention more efficient, and litigation holds more effective.'
The
development of digital databases and electronically stored information has

106 See Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Wade, 485 F.3d 1032, 1035 (8th Cir. 2007) (denying
innocent party remedy for spoliation of evidence). The court required bad faith because, "the
ultimate focus for imposing sanctions for spoliation of evidence is the intentional destruction of
evidence indicating a desire to suppress the truth, not the prospect of litigation." Id.
107 See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
108 See Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 108 (2d Cir. 2002)
(outlining reasons why negligence should be standard for adverse inference instruction).
109 See supra Part III(A) (discussing elements of spoliation).
110 See Residential Funding Corp., 306 F.3d at 108 (describing reasoning behind court's
ruling).
III See Killelea supra note 6, at 1060 (outlining mechanics of adverse inference jury
instruction). It is clear that jury instructions are not dispositive actions by the court that bind the
jury. See id. The jury would first have to determine whether spoliation occurred, then determine
whether to give weight to the spoliated evidence. See id.
112 See Pepe & Cohane, supra note 4, at 332-38 (explaining importance of document
retention policies): see also Killelea, supra note 6, at 1056 (describing obligations of potential
litigants in preserving documents).
113 See Kostel & Kelly, supra note 19, at 41 (describing vast sums spent in retrieving
documents). In order to cut costs in litigation, comprehensive document retention policies are
needed. See id.
114 See supra Part III(A) (describing spoliation in general, and its prevalence in litigation).
115 See Residential Funding Corp., 306 F.3d at 108 (describing reasoning behind court's
ruling): see also Killelea, supra note 6, at 1060 (outlining implementation of adverse inference
instruction).
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eased the process." 6 Consequently, negligence is the appropriate level of
culpability for an adverse inference instruction for spoliation of
evidence.' 17
V. CONCLUSION
The days of traditional paper discovery are over. Evidence that
used to fill countless cartons of paper can now fit onto one optical disk.
Technological advances have made it easier for large companies to retain
and store documents, and they have also made it easier for litigants to
access that information through discovery. With this in mind, these large
companies should, if they have not done so already, implement
comprehensive retention policies for this information. When litigation is
probable, these companies should also implement and enforce litigation
holds on the information to protect it from being destroyed.
The adversarial system of litigation depends on the basic concept
of fairness. Where each party is obligated to turn over relevant evidence to
the opposing party, discovery serves a key role in ensuring fairness for all
parties. When relevant documents are destroyed, the fairness of litigation
is lost. In order to preserve the integrity of discovery and the litigation
process as a whole, the judicial system should take affirmative steps to
prevent spoliation of electronic information. One method of ensuring
compliance with discovery rules is the imposition of sanctions on the
spoliating party, which is commonly the adverse inference instruction. For
the adverse inference instruction to be most effective in ensuring discovery
compliance, the innocent party should only have to prove negligence on the
part of the spoliator, not bad faith. With this lower level of culpability,
potential litigants will guarantee their own compliance by implementing
and enforcing comprehensive retention policies and litigation holds. For
this reason, negligence should be the level of culpability required for an
adverse inference instruction.
Ben Farrell

116 See Killelea, supra note 6, at 1056 (describing obligations of potential litigants in
preserving documents); see also Pepe & Cohane, supra note 4, at 332-38 (explaining the
importance of document retention policies).
117 See discussion supra notes 92-112 (analyzing purpose of negligence as standard for
adverse inference instruction in response to spoliation of electronic evidence).

